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Structural Racism, Structural Pollution and the Need 
for a New Paradigm 
Luke W. Cole* 
Caroline Farrell** 
Any serious attempt to address the issues of poverty, wealth and 
the working poor would do well to learn from the Environmental 
Justice movement, a broad-based national social movement that has 
emerged from the ground up over the past twenty years.1 The 
movement operates at the intersection of race, poverty and the 
environment, and offers hope in an otherwise bleak landscape of 
environmental and social justice advocacy. The movement offers a 
new paradigm for community leadership and control. 
This Article explores the need for that new paradigm, using one 
community’s struggle against toxic intrusion to illustrate the failure 
of the traditional paradigms of environmental and civil rights law.2 
The experiences of residents of the Waterfront South neighborhood 
of Camden, New Jersey, demonstrate the need to address the 
structural nature of both pollution and racism, and we offer an 
environmental justice approach as a start. 
 * Director, Center on Race, Poverty and the Environment, San Francisco, California. 
This Article was first presented at the Poverty, Wealth and the Working Poor conference at 
Washington University School of Law in April, 2005. I wish to thank Maxine Lipeles for the 
opportunity to take part in the conference, and Ingrid Brostrom and Tanika James for research 
assistance on this Article. 
 ** Managing Attorney, Center on Race, Poverty and the Environment, Delano, 
California. 
 1. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice in the Twenty-First Century, in THE 
QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 19 
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 2005); see also Olga D. Pomar & Luke W. Cole, Camden, New Jersey, 
and the Struggle for Environmental Justice, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 94, 94–95 (2002); Olga 
Pomar, Toxic Racism on a New Jersey Waterfront, in THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE, supra, at 126. 
 2. Pomar & Cole, supra note 1, at 104–06.  
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I. WATERFRONT SOUTH AND THE FAILURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Camden, New Jersey, is an economically depressed community 
across the Delaware River from Philadelphia. Following the collapse 
of its industrial base, Camden became one of the most blighted areas 
of the northeastern United States;3 when its manufacturing jobs 
disappeared, all that was left were heavily polluted industrial sites 
and abandoned factories.4 Camden became the poorest city in the 
state, and one of the poorest in the nation, with a per capita income of 
less than $8000 in 2002.5 
One Camden neighborhood is even more devastated and 
environmentally degraded than the rest—Waterfront South, a 
neighborhood of less than a square mile in South Camden between 
the river and an interstate.6 Waterfront South contains the South 
Jersey Port Corporation, which used to be a major shipbuilder, 
homes, boarded up stores, two federal Superfund sites,7 thirteen other 
known contaminated sites, four junkyards, a petroleum coke transfer 
station, a scrap metal recycling plant, numerous auto body shops, a 
paint company, a chemical company, three food processing plants, 
and other heavy industrial use sites.8 The huge U.S. Gypsum plant 
abuts the neighborhood to the north.9 
Despite this concentration of polluting facilities—and the 
attendant diesel truck traffic they require—decision-makers in 
Camden County and at the state level continue to target Waterfront 
South for undesirable land uses.10 The County chose Waterfront 
South as the site of a sewage treatment plant that serves thirty-five 
municipalities, and of an open-air sewage-sludge-composting facility 
 3. Id. at 98. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 99. 
 7. “Superfund” refers to a federal initiative to clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites 
authorized by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), which was enacted by Congress in 1980. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2000). Only 
sites that pose a serious danger to public health or the environment are eligible to be listed on 
the National Priority List as “Superfund sites.” For more information on Camden’s Superfund 
sites, see Pomar & Cole, supra note 1, at 99 n.26. 
 8. Pomar & Cole, supra note 1, at 99. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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next to the treatment plant.11 They also chose to put the garbage 
incinerator for the entire County’s trash in Waterfront South, 
followed by a massive co-generation power plant.12 The New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) granted permits for 
all of these projects, over local opposition.13 
“For years, Waterfront South residents endured sewage odors, 
diesel truck fumes, dust, and noise. The rates for asthma and other 
respiratory problems rose dramatically. At the same time, the area 
became more blighted, housing values dropped,” and it became 
increasingly difficult for the remaining residents to move out of the 
area.14 As of 2002, Waterfront South contained slightly more than 
2000 residents.15 Almost half of them were children, who are most 
vulnerable to pollution.16 
Thus, in 1999, when the St. Lawrence Cement Company (SLC) 
announced plans to build a huge cement-grinding facility in 
Waterfront South that would emit an additional one hundred tons of 
air pollutants each year, local residents said “enough is enough.”17 
They mobilized to fight the plant, but their efforts were hampered by 
several factors. First, because SLC would construct and operate its 
plant within the boundaries of the South Jersey Port Corporation, a 
state agency, the plant was exempt from review by local Camden 
authorities.18 Thus, those decision makers closest to the residents—
their own local elected officials—had no role in the permit approval 
process. 
Second, under New Jersey law, companies that submit a 
completed permit application to the DEP may begin to construct their 
facility prior to its approval, “at risk,” while the DEP processes the 
permit application.19 SLC completed its application and began 
construction in November, 1999, nine months before the first 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 99–100. 
 15. Id. at 100. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 100–01. 
 18. Id. at 101. 
 19. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-9.2(j) (West 1996); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:27-8.24 (2005). 
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opportunity for public comment on the project.20 By the time of the 
only public hearing on the matter, in August, 2000, construction of 
the plant was more than half finished.21 The DEP made no changes 
whatsoever to the facility as a result of public input, and granted SLC 
its permit in October, 2000.22 New Jersey Governor Christine Todd 
Whitman attended the ribbon-cutting ceremony for the plant, which 
the DEP heralded as a much-needed new investment in Camden. 
Local residents secured legal representation, and, with their 
lawyers, quickly realized that the new plant was “legal” under 
environmental law. The DEP had taken the necessary procedural 
steps in permitting the plant and would not be vulnerable to a legal 
challenge on environmental grounds.23 
The experience of Waterfront South residents illustrates the 
failure of environmental law to protect communities like Camden. 
Despite the overwhelming congregation of polluting industry in the 
neighborhood and the environmental health hazards faced by its 
residents, nothing in environmental law provided a means of stopping 
the facility.24 Under the law, the community’s input was heard only 
after construction of the facility was underway, and the DEP did not 
alter a single permit provision in response to that input. Clearly, the 
old paradigm of environmental law did not work for Waterfront 
South.25 
II. WATERFRONT SOUTH AND THE FAILURE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW  
There is another piece to the Camden picture: after thirty years of 
“white flight,” the city is home to an almost exclusively African-
American and Latino population.26 Ninety-four percent of Waterfront 
 20. Pomar & Cole, supra note 1, at 102. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Pomar, supra note 1, at 134. In the interest of full disclosure, the senior author is 
counsel to the community residents and represented them (along with lead counsel Olga Pomar 
of South Jersey Legal Services and co-counsel Jerome Balter and Michael Churchill of the 
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia) in the civil rights actions described in this Article. 
 24. South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Camden I), 145 F. 
Supp. 2d 446, 469 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 25. Sheila Foster, Remarks at the Washington Univ. Sch. of Law Poverty, Wealth and the 
Working Poor Conference (Mar. 31–Apr. 1, 2005). 
 26. Pomar & Cole, supra note 1, at 99. 
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South’s residents are people of color.27 Camden’s status as a 
community overwhelmingly made up of people of color and one of 
the most polluted cities in New Jersey is unfortunately not unique, 
nor unpredictable. Indeed, nationally, the Environmental Justice 
Movement arose as a community-based response to the well-
documented fact that low-income communities and communities of 
color bear a disproportionate burden of pollution.28 Beyond the 
empirical studies, the impact of environmental racism is something 
we understand intuitively.29 Think about the community in which you 
grew up, or in which you live now—where is the “wrong side of the 
tracks,” the heavy industrial neighborhood? Who lives there? And are 
we surprised? We know that inequality abounds, and that 
discrimination exists in the housing arena, the criminal justice 
system, educational settings, and labor markets, to name just a few. 
Why would environmental policy and the distribution of 
environmental benefits and burdens be any different? 
Given the overwhelming concentration of polluting facilities 
permitted by the DEP in Waterfront South, it was not difficult for the 
community residents’ experts to find that the DEP’s actions had a 
disparate impact on the community.30 The expert’s studies found 
disparate impact not only in Camden, but throughout New Jersey—
black people bore more environmental burdens than white people.31 
Professor Michel Gelobter, looking at the distribution of polluting 
facilities on a statewide basis, found that ZIP codes with higher than 
the state-wide average of 20.6% non-white residents had more than 
twice the air polluting facilities (13.7 facilities per ZIP code) than 
 27. Pomar, supra note 1, at 126. 
 28. See, e.g., LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: 
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 167 
(2001) (providing an annotated bibliography of studies and articles that document the 
disproportionate impact of environmental hazards by race and income). 
 29. See Manuel Pastor, Jr. et al., Environmental Inequity in Metropolitan Los Angeles, in 
THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 108, 110. 
 30. The community alleged a violation of their rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act, which required proof of disparate impact. See Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 450, 484. The 
litigation is discussed further infra Part II.A. 
 31. Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 461, 491–92 (“[I]n the State of New Jersey there is a 
strong, highly statistically significant, and disturbing pattern of association between the racial 
and ethnic composition of communities, the number of EPA regulated facilities, and the number 
of facilities with Air Permits.”) (internal quotations omitted); Pomar, supra note 1, at 126. 
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those with a below-average number of non-white residents.32 
Waterfront South had 2.3 times as many polluting facilities as the 
average New Jersey ZIP code.33 
Similarly, Professor Jeremy Mennis examined DEP’s permitting 
and enforcement.34 He found that in New Jersey, race was a 
significant predictor of proximity to air polluting facilities.35 On the 
enforcement side, he found that air-polluting facilities in 
communities of color had both less enforcement and lower penalties 
when violations were found.36 
A. The Civil Rights Lawsuit 
Facing a cement-grinding facility that was legal under 
environmental law, residents turned to the statutes ostensibly enacted 
to protect people of color—civil rights law. Their experience 
demonstrates the failure of the old paradigm of civil rights law, as 
well. The community sued SLC and the New Jersey DEP, alleging 
intentional discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,37 and discriminatory effect, or disparate impact discrimination, 
under the Title VI regulations of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).38 
Title VI was the Congressional response to the Civil Rights 
movement, and it bars discrimination by any entity that receives 
funding from the federal government.39 When Title VI was enacted, 
every federal agency implemented regulations to give it life; these 
regulations barred recipients of federal money from acting in a 
manner that had a disparate impact on people of color and other 
 32. Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 491. 
 33. Id. at 492. 
 34. Jeremy L. Mennis, The Distribution and Enforcement of Air Polluting Facilities in 
New Jersey, 57 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 411 (2005). 
 35. Id. at 419. 
 36. Id. at 420. 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 38. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10–.135 (2004); South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot. (Camden I), 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the grand of race, 
color, or national origin, . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
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protected classes.40 Unfortunately, since Title VI’s passage in 1964, 
the Supreme Court has systematically eviscerated the statute, 
stripping the concept of discriminatory impact from Title VI itself 
and holding in a series of decisions that one must prove intentional 
discrimination in order to establish a violation of section 601 of the 
statute.41 However, actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact 
could still be redressed through agency regulations promulgated 
under section 602 of Title VI,42 and these regulations provided the 
basis of the Camden residents’ suit. 
On April 19, 2001, Judge Orlofsky of the federal District Court in 
Camden issued an injunction against the cement plant prohibiting its 
operation.43 He found that there was indeed a disparate impact as 
prohibited by EPA regulations.44 The community’s experts had 
demonstrated that blacks in New Jersey were twice as likely to live 
near a polluting facility than whites.45 In a key part of Judge 
Orlofsky’s decision, he noted that this facility had all of its 
environmental permits—it was legal under environmental law—but 
that it still violated civil rights law.46 
The community’s victory was short-lived. On April 24, 2001, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided Alexander v. Sandoval47 (an unrelated 
case concerning drivers’ licenses in Alabama), holding that there is 
no private right of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations 
promulgated by federal agencies under section 602 of Title VI.48 In 
response, the Third Circuit quickly lifted Judge Orlofsky’s injunction, 
and, citing Sandoval, ruled that the Camden plaintiffs could not sue 
 40. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (2004). 
 41. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (interpreting various opinions of 
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that Title VI proscribes only 
those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection clause or the Fifth 
Amendment). 
 42. Choate, 469 U.S. at 293 (citing Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 584). 
 43. Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 505. 
 44. Id. at 492. 
 45. Id. at 491–92. 
 46. Id. at 469. 
 47. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 48. Id. at 293. 
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under a disparate impact theory.49 Although the district court found 
discriminatory impact as a result of DEP’s decisions—factual 
findings not overturned on appeal—Camden residents were left 
without judicial recourse. The old question, “What good is a right if 
you can’t enforce it?,” demonstrates the failure of the old paradigm of 
civil rights law for communities like Camden.50 
The Supreme Court in Sandoval, in taking away the public’s right 
to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under section 
602 of Title VI, granted federal agencies the sole discretion to 
enforce these anti-discrimination measures.51 The experience of 
Camden residents illustrates the empty promise of the Supreme 
Court’s decision. 
B. EPA’s Title VI Administrative Complaint Process 
Camden residents also filed an administrative complaint with the 
EPA under the agency’s Title VI regulations.52 They might appear to 
have had an easy route to victory with this administrative 
complaint—after all, a federal judge had already found 
discriminatory disparate impact in violation of the EPA’s own 
regulations.53 However, a unique political situation, combined with 
an utter failure by the EPA to enforce its own regulations, doomed 
the Camden residents’ chances at redressing the civil rights violations 
in this manner. 
 49. South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Camden II), 274 F.3d 
771 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 50. As lead counsel Olga Pomar noted: 
[The] Third Circuit Court’s decision thus placed the SCCIA in the peculiar position of 
having obtained a ruling, still in effect, that the state environmental agency’s practices 
violated civil rights, and of having no ability to benefit from that ruling. Meanwhile, 
the cement company continues to operate, releasing invisible but dangerous 
particulates from its smokestack. 
Pomar, supra note 1, at 135. 
 51. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; see also Pomar, supra note 1. 
 52. See Letter from Jerome Balter, Attorney, Pub. Interest Law Ctr. of Phila., to Anne 
Goode, Dir., Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 4, 2000) (on file with author). 
 53. South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Camden I), 145 F. 
Supp. 2d 446, 493 (D.N.J. 2001). 
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It is instructive to remember the political circumstances that 
existed in early 2001. The newly-appointed EPA administrator, to 
whom Camden residents appealed, was, in an unfortunate 
coincidence, former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman. 
Thus, the residents asked the very governor whose DEP had 
approved the SLC permit, and who had attended the ribbon-cutting 
for the opening of the SLC plant, to now declare her own 
gubernatorial administration’s actions a violation of civil rights. 
Given this situation, the residents were unlikely to prevail in their 
administrative complaint, and, to no one’s surprise, they did not.54 
But it would be a mistake to ascribe the failure of EPA to act on 
the Camden residents’ complaint to this unique circumstance. Indeed, 
their complaint fared no differently than almost 150 other civil rights 
complaints filed under Title VI with the EPA.55 Since 1992, when the 
first environmental justice Title VI complaints56 were filed with the 
agency, it has never ruled in favor of a complainant.57 It has 
dismissed a majority of the complaints on procedural grounds, 
sometimes appropriately, sometimes speciously.58 It has tortured its 
own regulations and policy to rule against the complainants in every 
case in which it has made a decision on the merits.59 And it has 
allowed cases to die from malnutrition, withering away for lack of 
 54. Pomar, supra note 1, at 140. 
 55. See Letter from Anne Goode, Dir., Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Jerome Balter, Attorney, 
Pub. Interest Law Ctr. of Phila. (Mar. 30, 2001) (on file with author) (refusing to process the 
complaint). 
 56. That is, complaints about environmental hazards, rather than about employment 
discrimination. 
 57. EPA OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE VI COMPLAINTS FILED WITH EPA (2005), 
http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/t6csjuly05.pdf; see also Julie R. Domike & Arthur W. Ray, 
Courts Focus on Title VI Issues in Locating Industrial Plants in Low-Income Areas, NAT'L L.J., 
Dec. 1, 1997, at C1; Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Permits Cited in Civil Rights 
Complaints Have Remained Valid, EPA Official Says, 152 Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 7, 
1998). 
 58. TITLE VI COMPLAINTS FILED WITH EPA, supra note 57; Paul Connolly, 
Environmental Justice: Mayors Rap EPA at Meeting with Browner for Failure to Consult on 
Interim Guidance, [1998] 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 658 (July 24, 1998) (noting that 
as of July 1998, EPA had rejected a significant number of the complaints filed with the agency); 
Hogue, supra note 57, at A9. 
 59. Luke W. Cole, Wrong on the Facts, Wrong on the Law: Civil Rights Advocates 
Excoriate EPA’s Most Recent Title VI Misstep, [1999] 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
10,775 (Dec. 1999) (discussing the first administrative Title VI complaint that EPA decided on 
the merits). 
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attention over the years.60 Several cases filed in 1994 and 1995 have 
yet to be resolved. So, the EPA is no protector of civil rights in the 
environmental context.61 The seeming futility of expecting a federal 
agency to follow and enforce its own regulations starkly illustrates 
the failure of the old civil rights paradigm. 
III. THE LESSONS OF WATERFRONT SOUTH 
The Camden case is emblematic of the failure of both civil rights 
and environmental law to protect communities facing these 
environmental hazards. We need a new paradigm. This need is 
further illustrated by examining the theoretical approaches some 
scholars have taken to the disparate impact of environmental hazards. 
In the “old paradigm,” poverty is a result of individual 
inadequacy—the poor are to blame for their situation. Consequently, 
collective responsibility for that poverty is limited.62 This argument 
has its analogy in the environmental injustice context, in which Vicki 
Been is among the most prominent theorists in this camp. She has 
written extensively on how the disparate impact of some 
environmental hazards might be explained by the fact that people are 
“coming to the nuisance;” that is, the polluting industry was there 
first, and poor people and people of color proceeded to move into the 
neighborhood.63 Under this formulation, environmental inequity is 
essentially volitional. It is the choice of poor people and people of 
color to live near polluting industries. That is just the “free market.”64 
 60. Id. at 10,776; see also TITLE VI COMPLAINTS FILED WITH EPA, supra note 57; U.S. 
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT IN MY BACKYARD: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898 AND TITLE VI 
AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2003), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ 
envjust/ch3.htm. 
 61. NOT IN MY BACKYARD, supra note 60. 
 62. See Beverly H. Wright, Effects of Occupational Injury, Illness, and Disease on the 
Health Status of Black Americans: A Review, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 114, 118–19 (Bunyan I. Bryant & Paul 
Mohai eds., 1992) (explaining “victim blaming”). 
 63. Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A 
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 27 (1997).  
 64. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: 
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1388–92 (1994); see also 
THOMAS LAMBERT & CHRISTOPHER BOERNER, ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUITY: ECONOMIC 
CAUSES, ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS 16 (1995); James Hamilton, Testing for Environmental 
Racism: Prejudice, Profits, and Political Power? 14 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 107 (1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol20/iss1/9
p265 Cole Farrell book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  The Need for a New Paradigm 275 
 
 
 
Within this “old paradigm,” there are both liberal and 
conservative camps, just as in the broader poverty debate.65 The 
conservatives say, “We should not interfere with the marketplace, let 
the free market work.”66 Basically, the status quo is acceptable.67 
Christopher Boerner and Thomas Lambert, apologists for the 
disparate impact, write that people choose to assume the risk to get 
the “benefit” of lower housing prices.68 On the other hand, the 
liberals say, “Let’s make sure that if any industry is located where 
people live, it is following all of its permits, and if new industry 
wants to come in, that the people who live there are fully involved.”69 
Basically, if industry follows the rules, then no remedy is needed. 
These outcomes are the natural functionings of our economy, and that 
is that. 
To analogize, let us imagine a busy roadway, with cars and trucks 
whizzing along. A man waiting on one side of the roadway sees his 
opportunity to cross, and starts to do so. He is hit by a truck. Two 
“old paradigm”-ers are watching this situation, one liberal, the other 
conservative. The liberal says, “Oh my gosh! Did you see if the light 
was red or green?” Because if the light was green—that is, if the 
truck had permission to be whizzing along—then her response is 
different than if the light were red, and the truck was violating the 
law. The conservative says, “He knew what the risk was in crossing 
the street, and he assumed that risk. That’s the free market.” 
Though the analyses of liberal and conservative old paradigm 
thinkers are different in this exaggerated example, their ultimate 
conclusions are the same. Analogous outcomes are reached when 
these groups evaluate the disparate impact of environmental hazards. 
In the conservative position, the disparate impact of environmental 
hazards is fine because the residents chose to live in that community 
and assumed the risk; that is just the market working. In the liberal 
position, if the facility has all of its permits and is not violating them, 
and the process for siting that facility was “fair,” then the community 
 65. Cf. Mark Rank, Toward a New Understanding of American Poverty, 20 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 17 (2006). 
 66. LAMBERT & BOERNER, supra note 64. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Been & Gupta, supra note 63. 
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bearing the brunt of the subsequent pollution has no recourse. In 
essence, the facility had a green light. 
The old paradigm, in both its draconian conservative guise and in 
its concerned liberal mode, ignores the structural nature of both 
pollution and racism in our society.70 Relying on the market to 
redress environmental injustice is unreasonable. As Bill Quigley 
observes, “[e]xpecting only the unguided market to steadily create 
good jobs at good wages is like expecting your car to watch your 
kids. It cannot happen.”71 Similarly, expecting the market alone to 
“solve” the problem of pollution and its disparate impacts is simply 
unrealistic. The market is not designed to protect people from 
pollution—indeed, under our market-based system, there is little 
disincentive to pollute, as pollution is an externality.72 Instead, we 
need to look beyond the market and examine the structural nature of 
pollution and racism in our society. 
IV. A STRUCTURAL UNDERSTANDING OF POLLUTION AND RACISM 
It is important to recognize that both pollution and racism have 
structural underpinnings which will inevitably lead to racist outcomes 
unless affirmatively attacked and prevented. 
A. Pollution is Structural 
Pollution is an externality—a cost of a product that is not borne by 
the producer or the consumer, but by society at large.73 This means 
that the producer is making more profit, as the cost of polluting is less 
 70. Their factual assumptions are simply wrong as well. Empirically, “the 
disproportionate location of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities in 
communities of color is the result of facility siting decisions and not simply a market-induced 
move-in of poor residents of color to lower-rent areas that are already affected by 
environmental hazards.” Pastor, Jr., supra note 29, at 121. 
 71. WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY, ENDING POVERTY AS WE KNOW IT: GUARANTEEING A RIGHT 
TO A JOB AT A LIVING WAGE 7 (2003). 
 72. See LAMBERT & BOERNER, supra note 64, at 17–18. “Economists refer to pollution as 
an ‘external cost’ or ‘negative externality’: negative because it is undesirable, and an externality 
because it affects those who are outside of (i.e. who have no control over) the process that 
creates it.” Id. 
 73. Id. 
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than the cost of purifying the waste prior to discharge.74 In fact, the 
market economy tends to create more pollution—by externalizing 
costs, the producer can lower prices, increase the quantity of goods 
sold, gain more market share, and eventually reap greater profits.75 
Because profit is the ambition of the market economy, then the 
market by its very nature creates more pollution as an inevitable by-
product of its operation. It is only government intervention into the 
market, in the form of regulation, that controls pollution. And control 
is the operative word—the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and 
other environmental laws do little to eliminate pollution, instead 
setting up elaborate systems for regulating its discharge.76 As anyone 
who has lived next to a polluting plant can tell you, whether or not it 
is “legal” pollution—that is, whether or not the emissions are within 
that factory’s permitted limits—it still causes disease, illness, and 
death. It still triggers asthma, even if the plant is not violating its 
permit. Our market system operates to create pollution, and our 
regulatory system is designed to control it, but it still exists. It is part 
of the structure of our economy. 
B. Racism is Structural 
Racism in this country is also structural, and therefore the simple 
workings of the marketplace have a racially disproportionate—
indeed, a racist—outcome. Facially neutral decisions can lead to the 
silent violence of toxic racism. 
For example, suppose a business owner in 2006 wants to build a 
new factory that will emit a certain amount of toxic pollution. There 
are three main criteria the owner will likely evaluate to find a location 
for the factory: appropriate zoning, access to transportation, and 
cheap land.77 Using these “neutral” criteria, the factory will often be 
 74. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (1968). 
 75. Producers have no incentive to change this situation, making effective regulation 
difficult. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 352 (3d ed. 1986) (“In 
the deliberations before the . . . agency leading to the formulation of the [pollution control] 
standard, the affected industry has an incentive to propose the cheapest pollution control 
method, regardless of its efficacy.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). 
 77. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 28, at 73. 
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sited in a low-income community of color because each of the three 
criteria have a racial component.78 None are “neutral” in their history 
or in their present day application. 
Since its inception in the early part of the last century, zoning has 
been used to regulate land use.79 It has also been used to regulate 
where people live—to segregate people.80 Environmental racism is 
found at the intersection of those two uses. Economist Yale Rabin has 
documented the racial—and racist—history of zoning, wherein 
predominately white decision-making bodies systematically “down-
zoned” the classification of stable residential communities of people 
of color to allow for industrial uses.81 White decision-makers 
routinely placed black neighborhoods next to or within industrial 
areas or in areas where unpleasant land uses such as stockyards were 
located. While de facto segregation is no longer legal, the land use 
patterns (and the industrial zoning) created by these decision-makers 
still controls in many communities across the country. So if a 
business person in 2006 seeks to develop an industrial site and looks 
solely in areas zoned for industrial uses, in many cases that factory is 
more likely to end up near communities of color than white 
communities.82 
Producers want their factories to be located near freeways, making 
them more accessible for trucks carrying raw materials in and 
finished products out. One must then ask, where are the freeways? 
Why are they there? The decision-making of the 1950s and early 
1960s about the placement of our highway system in urban areas was 
explicitly racial, and racist.83 “Urban renewal” of that period meant 
tearing down or running freeways through the “ghettos”—often 
 78. Id. at 70–74. 
 79. See Yale Rabin, Explusive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND 
THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 101, 103–06 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. 
Kayden eds., 1989). 
 80. Id. at 106–08. 
 81. Id. at 108–19 (collecting anecdotal evidence of “expulsive zoning,” the permitted 
intrusion into black neighborhoods of disruptive incompatible uses that diminish the quality and 
undermine the stability of those neighborhoods). 
 82. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 28, at 70–74. 
 83. Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to HIGHWAY ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM & 
NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY 1, 4–5 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 2004). 
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stable residential African-American communities.84 Thus, if a 
business makes a siting decision based on proximity to freeways, it is 
disproportionately likely to end up in a black community. 
Putting aside the impact of heavy industrial zoning (which drives 
down land values) and proximity to freeways (which drives down 
residential land values), land values in and of themselves also have a 
racial component.85 Sociologists Douglass Massey and Nancy 
Denton, in their groundbreaking book American Apartheid, 
documented the willingness of white people to pay a premium in 
order to avoid living near or among black people.86 Because of this 
racism, land in white communities is more expensive than land in 
black communities. Therefore, decisions based on land values will 
steer factories and other businesses toward African-American 
communities. 
In relying on the “neutral” criteria of zoning, access to 
transportation and land values, the non-racist business owner in 2006 
is silently and unwittingly guided by society’s structural racism into 
siting a new polluting plant in a manner that has a racially disparate 
impact. As Mark Rank notes, “American poverty is largely the result 
of structural . . . failings.”87 This observation has equal application in 
the environmental context—the inequitable distribution of 
environmental hazards in this country is the result of structural 
failings. Until that is recognized, environmental injustice cannot be 
appropriately remedied. 
V. THE NEW PARADIGM: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
The Environmental Justice movement has contributed a series of 
significant theoretical perspectives to the discourse on how to solve 
environmental problems. We briefly discuss three such perspectives 
here to illustrate their potential for reframing the environmental 
 84. See Omar Freilla, Burying Robert Moses’ Legacy in New York, in HIGHWAY 
ROBBERY, supra note 83 (describing the devastating and long-lasting effects of Robert Moses’ 
transportation policies in New York City in the 1920s–60s). 
 85. Been, supra note 64. 
 86. DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). 
 87. Rank, supra note 65, at 26. 
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debate: the ideas of communities speaking for themselves, of 
pollution prevention, and of the precautionary principle.88 
A. “We Speak for Ourselves” 
One of the central tenets of the Environmental Justice movement 
is that communities should speak for themselves—that is, when 
decisions are being made, those affected by the decisions should have 
a prominent place at the table.89 As Bill Quigley advises, “a radical 
revolution of values prizes the perspective of those at the margins.”90 
This is a fundamental teaching of the Environmental Justice 
movement. 
B. Pollution Prevention 
When the toxic waste industry asked the question, “Where should 
we put this incinerator if not in your backyard?,” environmental 
justice activists responded with their own paradigm-shifting question: 
“Why produce the toxic waste in the first place?” Rather than trying 
to determine the best way to treat lead poisoning, environmental 
justice activists ask, why not remove lead from homes so children are 
not poisoned?91 Rather than accepting the status quo of pollution, 
these activists seek to change production practices upstream so that 
pollution is eliminated. In many cases they have been successful, and 
indeed the concept of pollution prevention is now being embraced by 
the federal government.92 
 88. The Environmental Justice Framework was developed by countless community 
activists across the United States over the past decade, and most cogently articulated by Bob 
Bullard in Environmental Justice in the Twenty-first Century, in THE QUEST FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 25, 25–30. 
 89. WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES: SOCIAL JUSTICE, RACE, AND ENVIRONMENT (Dana A. 
Alston ed., 1990). 
 90. William P. Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering: Addressing the Root Causes of Poverty 
& Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 125 (2006). 
 91. Bullard, supra note 88, at 26. 
 92. See Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b) (2000) (“The Congress 
hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that pollution should be 
prevented or reduced at the source whenever feasible.”). 
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C. The Precautionary Principle 
Perhaps the central failure of environmental regulation is that 
companies are allowed to pollute until that pollution is deemed 
harmful. Then, after the harm is found, the pollutant is regulated, or 
regulated more stringently. The onus of proving a chemical harmful 
is on those seeking to regulate it, which often means that chemicals 
with a dramatic and long-term impact on society—DDT or 
chlorofluorocarbons or methyl bromide—take years to remove from 
the market. Environmental justice activists have pushed to reframe 
this debate as well, shifting the presumption of harmful pollution 
from “innocent until proven guilty” to “guilty until proven innocent.” 
The idea, called the precautionary principle, is that companies must 
demonstrate that a chemical is safe before it can be introduced for 
widespread use.93 
These three principles are the foundational underpinnings of a 
new paradigm—one that directly involves those affected by 
environmental hazards in decisions about those hazards; one that 
challenges industry to change its processes to eliminate, rather than 
merely control, pollution; and one that forces industry to prove that 
chemicals are safe before they can be employed, rather than using 
communities as live testing laboratories for the effects of toxic 
chemicals. While it is too late for these concepts to help the Camden 
residents fight the SLC cement-grinding facility, which has operated 
now for four years, it is not too late for these concepts to prevent the 
next toxic intrusion into that community, or into yours. All it takes is 
the determination to shift the paradigm. As Robert Bullard points out: 
Change in the dominant environmental protection paradigm 
did not come from an effort made by regulatory agencies, the 
polluting industry, academia or the industry built around risk 
management. Instead, impetus for the change came from a 
movement led by a loose alliance of grassroots and national 
environmental and civil rights leaders who questioned the 
foundation of the current environmental protection paradigm.94 
 93. Bullard, supra note 88, at 28. 
 94. Id. at 30. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
By allowing the over-pollution of certain areas that host a 
disproportionate number of polluting facilities, environmental laws 
have failed communities like Camden. In part because of judicial 
evisceration and executive non-enforcement, civil rights laws have 
also failed such communities. Only through a paradigm shift away 
from these models can we address the structural nature of pollution 
and racism. Environmental justice is one such new paradigm pointing 
the way to a healthier, more just future for communities like Camden. 
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